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Abstract. The standardization landscape in the Information and Communication technology 
industries is fragmented in many different standardization bodies, industry consortia, and 
alliances. Some of these coalitions cooperate with each other, while others compete. The 
existence of competing standardization coalitions may prevent coordination on a common 
standard. There is a lot of debate among practitioners and analysts about whether this 
fragmentation creates a coordination failure. This paper takes a middle ground in this debate. 
Competition between standardization coalitions may indeed harm compatibility, but it also helps 
to mitigate coordination failures within standardization bodies and coalitions. The negotiation 
process in a coalition can cause coordination failures of its own. An important failure is lack of 
timeliness, due to delaying tactics by company delegates in the coalition. Introducing competition 
between coalitions can speed up negotiations within them, and thus help to overcome this intra-
committee coordination failure. A game theoretic model explores the effect of competition 
between coalitions on the speed of decision-making and standardization. 
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Introduction 
The standardization landscape in the Information and Communication technology industries is 
fragmented in many different standardization bodies, industry consortia, and alliances. Some of 
these coalitions cooperate with each other, while others compete. The existence of competing 
standardization coalitions may prevent coordination on a common standard. There is a lot of 
debate among practitioners and analysts about whether this fragmentation leads to coordination 
failures. A better understanding of why companies have standardization strategies that give rise to 
fragmentation may show the possible advantages of fragmentation.  
Compatibility standards set specifications for components that make it possible to 
connect these components to each other. In the information and communication technology 
industries, the examples of these components are hardware and software. By connecting devices, 
end users can improve their performance (complementary products) or service providers can help 
their end users interact with each other. Standards create value when they make it possible to 
realize positive network externalities for the end users or for their suppliers. The standardization 
process can therefore be an important value-generating process. How this process is organized, 
the standardization mode, affects the outcome of the standardization process. Standardization 
processes are partly organized in coalitions. How many coalitions there are, and how many 
members each has, is known as the coalition structure of the standardization process (Bloch, 
1995). An important aspect of the standardization mode is the level of centralization, defined here 
as the extent to which decision-making about standards is concentrated in one or more coalitions.  
The most centralized coalition structure is the grand coalition: a coalition that includes 
all participants in the standardizing process. In the case of a standard that affects an industry, this 
will be an industry-wide coalition. The advantage of a grand coalition is that this level of 
coordination assures that a single standard will be established. As a result, technologies in use are 
fully compatible and positive network externalities can be realized. Other standardization modes 
are more decentralized. In many cases there are competing coalitions. Many standardization 
processes are highly fragmented as a result (Genschel, 1997). If competing coalitions set 
different, incompatible, standards, some network externalities will not be realized. How 
centralized the emerging coalition structure will be depends on the pros and cons of the various 
possible coalition structures. We will focus on the aspect of timing to highlight the pros and cons 
of coalition structures with different levels of centralization.  
The grand coalition is the most centralized coalition structure. The rationale for a grand 
coalition is that all relevant parties will adopt the specifications (standards or recommendations) 
that it will develop. It has access to the widest number of players and their information. A 
consensual decision-making process means that specifications are accepted only if no none holds 
out against them. The consensus provides legitimacy to its specifications. Due to its 
comprehensive membership, information about the new standards is widely available in the field.  
Choosing a standardization mode leads to trade-offs. One of these trade-offs is about the 
speed of decision-making. A grand coalition may have to comprise large number of participants. 
These may have many different backgrounds. There may be antagonistic organizations among 
them. These can slow down decision-making. One way to speed up decision-making is by 
excluding participants who would slow down decision-making. Participants with different or 
opposite interests may, for instance, be excluded from the coalition. Those who are excluded may 
go on to form their own committee (Axelrod, Mitchell, Thomas, Bennett, & Bruderer, 1995; 
Belleflamme, 1998; Bloch, 1995; Economides & Flyer, 1998; Greenlee & Cassiman, 1999). For 
instance, Bloch (1995) argues that the more firms are direct rivals, the more tempted they are to 
exclude rivals from their coalition. The better substitutes their products are, the less likely that a 
grand coalition will appear, and the more likely that rivals establish competing committees. If 
competing committees are formed, they may accept different, incompatible technologies as a 
standard.  
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This argument leads to a circumscribed defense of fragmentation. A grand coalition has a 
better chance of ensuring compatibility between the technologies used in an industry than 
competing coalitions. The higher the degree of compatibility between the technologies actually 
adopted by service providers, the more service providers can realize positive externalities. A 
grand coalition may also take more time to arrive at a decision than competing coalitions. It may 
fall prey to delaying tactics by delegates of competing firms. This delay represents an intra-
coalition coordination failure. The smaller size of competing coalitions, and the competition 
between them, tend to speed up their decision-making. This greater speed does come at the 
possible risk of selecting incompatible technologies, which generates an inter-coalition 
coordination failure. How this trade-off between speed and compatibility affects the degree of 
centralization in the coalition structure is the topic of this paper.  
The paper consists of two parts. It begins with a review of the literature. The review 
concludes with a conceptual model of the selection of coalition structures for standardization. A 
game theoretic model subsequently explores the basic assumptions and possible results of this 
conceptual model.  
 
The trade-off between timing and coordination 
Two questions motivate this paper. First, does the menu of possible coalition structures confront 
firms with a trade-off between timing and compatibility? There will be a trade-off if the more a 
coalition structure succeeds in raising the degree of compatibility between different technologies, 
the longer its standardization process takes. And, secondly, if there is this trade-off, how does it 
affect the preferences firms may have for possible coalition structures? If there are potential 
network externalities, firms will derive value from compatibility. Establishing compatibility 
requires the selection of standards, which takes time. Firms are willing to give up some 
compatibility for the sake of speeding up the selection of standards. The more important 
compatibility is to them, the more they are willing to give up some speed of decision making. 
 
Figure 1: the trade-off between timing and the degree of compatibility 
 
Figure 1 combines the two aspects of the trade-off. The concave curve combines all combinations 
of the degree of compatibility and the useful lifetime that can be achieved with the existing set of 
standardization modes. This curve will be concave if the more centralized the coalition structure 
is, the higher the degree of compatibility that it tends to be able to achieve, at a cost of a slower 
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standardization process. The straight lines in figure 1 are payoff indifference curves: 
combinations of the degree of compatibility and speed of standardization that offer the same 
benefit to the firm.1 If, for example, the degree of compatibility has a relatively large effect on 
revenues, a firm is willing to give up some compatibility only in exchange for a large increase in 
the speed of standardization. This suggests a small compatibility / lifetime slope in figure 1. The 
further out the indifference curve is from the origin, the higher the level of payoffs it represents. 
A firm will prefer the coalition structure (a point on the concave curve) that lies on its highest 
located indifference curve (straight line). If, as illustrated in figure 1, a firm is willing to give up 
very little compatibility for the sake of speeding up standardization (a barely sloped indifference 
curve), this suggests a preference for a centralized standardization mode, such as the grand 
coalition. 
 For an individual firm, the preference for a standardization mode boils down to the 
question how much compatibility it is willing to give up for a higher speed of the standardization 
process (the straight lines), and which standardization mode best fits this preference (the concave 
curve). Figure 1 represents a situations where two propositions apply: first, that coalition 
structures cause a trade-off between speed and compatibility, and second, that firms are willing to 
trade in some speed of standardization for the sake of greater compatibility. We will investigate 
both propositions in sequence.  
Trade-offs caused by the standardization mode 
The first question to address is how coalition structures affect the degree of compatibility that can 
be achieved, and the speed of standardization. The proposition we wish to explore is that the 
higher the level of centralization of a coalition structure, the higher the chance that it generates 
compatibility at industry level, and the longer standardization tends to take.  
Centralization and speed of standard selection 
The first impact of a coalition structure is that the more inclusive an individual coalition is, the 
longer it takes to agree on a standard. There is an initialization phase to a partnership (Zajac & 
Olsen, 1993). In this initialization phase, firms communicate, negotiate, analyze feasibility 
studies, and forge relational exchange norms. Which factors can facilitate this process? One 
factor will be the size of the coalition. The more members in a committee, the more alternative 
technologies there may be to choose between. Communication takes time. The more people are 
involved, the more time it takes to communicate with them. If participants have different 
backgrounds, it can take time to translate concepts between them. They will need to develop a 
common vocabulary. In the Internet tradition, for example, participants in a standardization 
process will often need to define concepts first, using a document type called a Request for 
Comments, RFC. An example is RFC 2119 of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), which 
defines among others the meaning of concepts such as must, must not, shall, etc., when used in 
standards. 2 
There are factors that may shorten the initialization phase. Prior contacts between the 
partners can facilitate the set-up of a partnership. This may explain an insight about partner 
choice in strategic alliances: firms with prior contacts are more likely to become partners in an 
alliance (Gulati, 1995).  
The political process in a grand coalition may slow down decision-making. The sponsor 
of a specific standard may take time to influence the grand coalition. A sponsor is a firm that 
                                                     
1 Where payoffs are defined in terms of the goals that firms pursue, such as profits, cash flow, growth, 
market share, etc. 
2 See http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt for this RFC (Nov. 2002). Note that an RFC is a standard, in the 
language of the IETF. 
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actively supports a particular specification for a standard through a standardization process. It is 
likely to be a firm that expects more benefits from a successful standardization process than most 
other participants. It is, for example, the innovator who developed the technology that can be 
standardized. If multiple sponsors jockey for position in a grand coalition, they may slow down 
the process of creating consensus and selecting a standard.  
A sponsor may try to win over the grand coalition by actively participating in its 
activities. Organizations may invest in influencing activities to influence the coalition’s decision 
making (Besen & Farrell, 1994). In the ICT industries, for instance, sponsors influence official 
standardization bodies by means of the contributions they make to the work of these bodies. An 
interesting paper observes that large companies increased the number of staff they dispatch to 
meetings of official organizations, such as the IETF and the IEEE (the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers) (Heywood, Jander, Roberts, & Saunders, 1997). They hire people who 
have gained influence and reputations in official standard setting organizations. They also try to 
influence who will chair workgroups of standardization organizations. As Heywood et al. (1997) 
show, standardization organizations are aware of these possibilities, and try to design rules to 
suppress them. 
Rules and procedures in standardization coalitions may suppress dysfunctional behavior 
of individual participants. They may also diminish the influence of these participants. As a result, 
these firms may abandon the coalition and set up competing coalitions. In a decentralized 
standardization mode with multiple competing coalitions, an individual firm has a larger chance 
of influencing its particular coalition. But there is the real chance that having competing 
coalitions leads to incompatible technologies being used in the market place. A grand coalition 
may want to prevent defection by being very responsive to the interests of its members. Too 
much responsiveness may bog down the standardization process (Sherif, 2003). Hence, a grand 
coalition faces some tension between speeding up decision making and ensuring compatibility of 
new technologies. 
 Grand coalitions such as formal standard setting bodies know they need to speed up 
decision-making (David & Shurmer, 1996). One of the solutions is to produce incomplete 
standardization by means of meta-standards. A meta-standard establishes some conditions and 
aspects of a standard, without specifying the standard itself in full detail. Settling details of a 
standard can take a lot of time. Setting a meta-standard avoids the need to fine-tune the standard, 
and thus speeds up decision making. The advantage of having a meta-standard in an early stage is 
that it pre-empts companies that might otherwise commit to incompatible technologies. A 
disadvantage of setting a meta-standard is that private companies adopt technologies that are only 
partially standardized. Their technologies may be partially incompatible. This solution therefore 
gives up some compatibility in order to speed up decision making in a grand coalition. 
Centralization and compatibility 
A second impact of coalition structure is that more centralized it is, the more likely that a single 
standard prevails. In particular, a grand coalition is more likely to adopt a single standard than 
competing coalitions. A grand coalition can select a standard from among competing 
technologies. It may also try to combine different technologies into a compromise standard. The 
DVD standard is the result of such a compromise.3 The DVD consortium combined the 
multimedia CD coalition of Philips, Sony, and 3M, with the super density CD of Toshiba and 
Time Warner. The combination gave rise to the DVD specification, albeit after specification and 
format disagreements in the DVD consortium delayed the introduction of DVD products. A grand 
coalition or industry-wide standard development organization can also design specifications to 
                                                     
3 Source: Aguilar, Rose (1996) Philips, Sony team to hurry up DVD, Cnet, http://news.com.com/2102-
1023-219879.html, August 2, 1996. 
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reduce incompatibility. For example, the IEEE has developed several standards for wireless data 
communication. Some of these technologies use the same unlicensed frequency band. As a 
consequence, wireless systems can interfere. Interference can diminish the quality of the signal. 
The IEEE developed standards for Wireless Local Area Networks and Wireless Personal Area 
Networks that reduce the disadvantages of interference. 4 
A grand coalition will not always be able to ensure compatibility when its members 
simultaneously play a game of de facto standardization. Participants in the grand coalition may 
try to create a fait-a-compli to force the coalition to bend to its wishes. A firm may start an 
installed base with its technology in an attempt to strengthen its bargaining power in the coalition. 
This leads to hybrid standardization: a standardization mode where firms pursue standardization 
by two simultaneous paths, using both the market mechanism and negation in the committee 
(Axelrod et al., 1995; Farrell & Saloner, 1988; Funk & Methe, 2001). In a hybrid standardization 
mode, a grand coalition cannot guarantee compatibility. The best way to prevent incompatibility 
in this case is for the grand coalition to agree on a standard fast, before some of its members have 
committed themselves to a de facto standard. A hybrid standardization mode may thus speed up 
standardization, but at a cost (Farrell & Saloner, 1988). The cost may be that companies adopt 
incompatible technologies. 
 While the grand coalition may not guarantee compatibility, the presence of competing 
coalitions need not per se lead to incompatibility. If one committee adopts a standard quickly, the 
members of a competing coalition may adopt that standard (Genschel, 1997). In this case they 
abandon the slowest committee. Furthermore, competing committees make choices that do not 
have to be entirely incompatible. They may adopt partially overlapping technologies, leading to 
partial compatibility. In his book about Bill Gates, Wallace (1997) gives a more controversial 
example, when he attributes to Microsoft the strategy of embrace and extend. This strategy 
confronts a successful technology of a rival not by developing an incompatible alternative. 
Instead, the embrace and extend strategy is to adopt the technology, and then to extend it with 
proprietary extensions.5 Once users adopt these extensions, control over the technology shifts to 
Microsoft. Competing coalitions may have the same motive to adopt partially or wholly a rival 
committee’s technology. As a result, in a setting of competing coalitions, committee standards 
can be hybrids that combine elements from competing technologies (for an example, see 
Mangematin & Callon, 1995). 
 If standardization coalitions or organizations cannot avoid incompatible technologies, 
they can design standards such as to make it possible to have gateways between incompatible 
technologies. For example, the IETF and the ITU (the International Telecommunications Union) 
cooperated to develop the Megaco/H.248 gateway protocol to act as gateway between dissimilar 
networks.6 
 To conclude this discussion. It is likely, but by no means certain, that a grand coalition 
takes more time to conclude a standard than smaller competing coalitions would. It is, moreover, 
not self evident that a grand coalition ensures a higher degree of compatibility than competing 
coalitions would. If not, a grand coalition is unlikely to occur. In that case the choices of 
individual organizations boil down to which competing coalition to join. Only when a grand 
                                                     
4 Source: IEEE, http://www.ieee.org, Steve Shellhammer (2001) IEEE 802.15.2 Clause 5.1 Description of 
the Interference Problem, July 2, 2001. 
5 There is debate about whether this strategy is legal. Judge Motz of the U.S. district court in Baltimore 
ordered Microsoft to include Sun Microsystems' version of Java with the Windows operating system (Cnet, 
http://news.com.com/2102-1001-978786.html, Dec. 23, 2002). The verdict is a response to Sun’s suing 
Microsoft ‘for allegedly violating antitrust law in dropping Sun's version of Java and including its own 
version, which Sun alleges to be incompatible with its technology.’    
6 Source: IETF, 18-2-2002, http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/megaco-charter.html, and IETF, Request for 
Comments: 2805, April 2000, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2805.txt. 
 6 
coalition compensates for a longer duration of decision making by increasing the expected degree 
of compatibility, do firms face the trade-off depicted in figure 1.  
 
Effects of the standardization mode on firm goals 
If we accept that coalition structures represent different trade-offs between compatibility and 
speed of decision making, the next question that presents itself is: how do compatibility and speed 
in turn affect the ability of firms to realize their goals? The slope of the indifference curves in 
figure 1 depends on the relative effects of the degree of compatibility and of speed of 
standardization on the payoffs of the firm. There are thus two links to consider: the link between 
compatibility and payoffs, and the link between speed of standardization and payoffs. 
Compatibility, payoffs, and strategy 
The first link to look at is the link between the degree of compatibility and the payoffs of the 
organizations involved in standardization. An open industry-wide standard can be a platform for 
new services. This applies to anticipatory standards, which are standards for new technologies 
that will develop new services and associate markets (Sherif, 2003). There are direct network 
externalities if new services enable users to communicate with each other. The more users can 
communicate with each other, using standards-compliant equipment, the more benefits they 
derive from participating in the new service. This is how a standard can create value. The higher 
the degree of compatibility between the technologies used by vendors, the greater the value 
created in the product market (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). 
There may be reasons both on the demand side and on the supply side that reduce the 
value-creating effect of an industry-wide standard. If users tend to communicate in small 
communities, the sheer size of the network of users may not increase their benefit. As long as a 
standard dominates within their particular community, they may not care about standards used by 
other communities. A study by Cowan and Miller (1998) offers support for this intuition. It 
studies a case with local externalities, where neighbors are potential adopters of a standard to 
communicate or cooperate with each other. It finds that users may adopt incompatible 
technologies. Since they communicate locally, they are not aware (and do not care) of far away 
users adopting a different technology.  
If there are potential network externalities in a product market, service providers may try 
to achieve them even if there is no standard. They may find other ways to achieve the network 
externalities. They can start gateway services that connect users of incompatible technologies. 
Converters link the users of otherwise incompatible technologies. They help these users to 
achieve positive externalities (Choi, 1996). There are thus several factors, both on the demand 
side and the supply side, that can reduce the value generating effect of a standard. 
Even if compatibility is valuable for the market as a whole, individual firms may still find 
it in their interest to reduce the compatibility with other technologies. Negotiating a standard may 
affect the payoffs of firms in adverse ways. A sponsor may have intellectual property rights on 
the technology. A grand coalition may cause a sponsor to loose revenues from its property rights 
on the technology to be standardized. Submitting a technology to a Standard Development 
Organization (SDO) can limit the revenues from intellectual property rights (IPR) protection as 
the technology to be standardized has to be licensed to all takers on fair and reasonable terms. 
Grand coalitions can and sometimes do impose the same condition. Innovators may benefit if 
their innovation is accepted as a standard. They also want to earn revenues from their intellectual 
property rights on the innovation. They are concerned about the appropriability of revenue 
streams. They may care more about their share of the revenue stream from a standard than about 
the absolute size of revenues created by the standard. Patents are a case in point; they give the 
innovator some control over revenue flows generated by the innovation. If a standard increases 
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the value of the intellectual property right (IPR) on a technology, the firm may be more interested 
in supporting one particular technology than in having an industry-wide standard per se. A 
concern with intellectual property rights on technologies may lead to fragmentation of the 
standardization process. Blind (2001) finds empirical support for the argument that patent 
protection may make companies reluctant to set standards via national or international standard 
setting organizations (SDOs).  
There are thus various reasons why compatibility may not be valuable for the market as a 
whole, or at least for some players in it. In these cases a grand coalition, whose main job is to 
establish industry-wide standards, is not a likely channel for standardization. 
Speed, timing, and payoffs 
The second link to look into is the link between the timing aspect and the payoffs of the 
participants in standardization. How important is the time to market for the participants in the 
standardization process? If there are first move advantages, firms are likely to disagree with a 
time-consuming decision process in a committee. If, however, there are second move advantages, 
there is a benefit to waiting, and speeding up standardization may not be a priority at all. If 
technology improves continually, for example, users may switch to an incompatible technology if 
its quality is sufficiently higher than the established technology (Katz & Shapiro, 1992; Shy, 
1996). Shy (1996) shows among others that if new technology is backward compatible with the 
old technology, users are more likely to switch to the new technology. This reduces the lifetime 
of the older technology. The lifetime of a standard thus depends on the willingness of users to 
wait for better technology to appear. 
Speeding up standardization will be valuable if the benefits from the standard are time-
dependent. The standard is a specification for a technology. There are expectations about when 
the technology will be superseded by a superior technology. Technologies have a lifecycle; the 
more time in this cycle is absorbed the standardization process, the less time remains for using it 
in marketable products. A standard may be a platform for new or improved services. These 
services themselves have a product life cycle. Delaying the product introduction delays the start 
of revenues. Due to the time preference of the potential vendors, they are likely to want to speed 
up market introduction.  
 
Figure 2: Choice of coalition structure in the trade-off between speed and compatibility 
Standards 
                * Degree of compatibility (+) 
                * Time to market (-) 
Expected payoffs 
     * Preemption 
     * Time preferences 
     * Network externalities 
     * IPR 
Centralization of the coalition structure 
    * Grand coalition 
    * Competing coalitions 
Firm strategies 
     * Join a coalition 
     * Negotiate a standard 
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Figure 2 summarizes the relationships discussed so far. If firms have different preferences for the 
standardization mode, a battle ensues about the standardization mode itself (Besen & Farrell, 
1994). Their strategies, the coalition structures they give rise to, and the competition in the 
product market, determine the actual standardization mode. The next section presents a model 
that shows how the interactions in figures 1 and 2 play out. 
 
Selecting a standardization mode: a basic model 
The literature is thus able to identify the expected effects that the standardization mode has on 
both the degree of compatibility that will result, and on the speed of standardization. It also 
identifies how these effects influence the ability of the individual firm to achieve its goals. What 
do these insights tell us about which standardization mode will actually occur? This outcome 
depends on the interaction between firms, taking into account the relationships discussed above. 
We develop a basic model to explore this. It is based on the seminal paper by Farrell and Saloner 
(1988). 
In the model firms may form a grand coalition for an industry-wide standard, or they split 
up in competing groups. There are two technologies to choose from, 1 and 2. Firm 1 is sponsor of 
technology 1 and firm 2 is sponsor of technology 2. Firms 3 and 4 are indifferent between these 
two technologies; they do benefit from having a standard. If there is one standard, each firm earns 
a compatibility bonus c. In addition, the sponsor of the technology that is selected as standard 
earns the appropriability bonus a. If there are two competing technologies, each sponsor earns the 
appropriability benefit a; the other two firms earn zero payoffs. The appropriability bonus a 
captures among others the importance of intellectual property rights on technology. The 
compatibility bonus c captures the importance of positive network externalities for the expected 
payoffs. 
 
Competing committees 
With competing committees, each committee negotiates internally for a standard. We assume that 
each committee consists of a sponsor and a non-sponsor. Committee 1 consists of firms 1 and 3, 
while committee 2 consists of firms 2 and 4.7 Each firm in a committee chooses between 
accepting the sponsored technology as standard and the option to wait. Waiting implies the option 
to accept the technology of a rival firm as standard. Call γi the chance that committee i selects the 
technology of its sponsor as standard in this period. If both committees select a standard 
simultaneously, the competition between the two standards eliminates the expected payoffs of the 
firms. If one committee selects a standard and the other does not, the latter adopts the standard of 
the former committee. The payoff matrix in committee 1 is: 
 
Table 1: committee 1 session and payoffs 
Firm 3  
T1 Wait 
Firm 1 T1 (a+(1-γ2)c, (1-γ2)c) (y1, y3) 
                                                     
7 An alternative specification would be: two non-sponsors, firms 3 and 4, team up. They select a 
technology, join up with its sponsor, and set the standard. This would be the quickest way to get a standard. 
If, however, the sponsor left out introduces its technology independently, the ensuing technology 
competition destroys the compatibility bonus. With our assumptions an asymmetric coalition structure 
(firms 1,3, and 4 versus firm 2, for instance) is possible, but not efficient. It is possible, because the game 
here is purely about coordination: there is no other reason, such as the need to pool resources or market 
power, that requires firms to team up in a standardization coalition. 
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 Wait (y1, y3) (y1, y3) 
 
The expected payoffs of this game are (U1, U2, U3, U4). The wait option defers results to the next 
period. This means to either accept the rival committee’s selected standard, which it selected with 
a chance γ2, or to adjourn the committee and play the game again in the next round. That is, yi = 
δxi, where xi = (1-γ2)Ui + γ2c (i = 1, 3).  
 The mixed equilibrium for committee 1 leads to chance play. Firm 1 plays T1 with a 
chance α1 and wait with a chance of 1-α1. Firm 3 plays T1 with a chance α3 and wait with a 
chance of 1-α3. The expected payoffs of their game are: 
 
(1a) U1 = α1α3(a+(1-γ2)c) + (1-α1α3)y1. 
 
(1b)  U3 = α1α3(1-γ2)c + (1-α1α3)y3. 
 
The chance that committee 1 selects T1 as standard, γ1, equals α1α3.  
Firm 1 is indifferent between proposing T1 and waiting if the expected payoff of 
proposing T1 equals the expected payoff of waiting. This implies that α3(a+(1-γ2)c)+(1-α3)y1 = 
α3y1 + (1-α3)y1, where y1 = δ((1-γ2)U1 + γ2c), that is, 
 
(2a)  a+(1-γ2)c = δ((1-γ2)U1 + γ2c). 
 
Firm 3 is indifferent if its expected payoff of selecting T1 equals its expected payoff of waiting. 
That is, α1(1-γ2)c+(1-α1)y3 = α1y3 + (1-α1)y3, where y3 = δ((1-γ2)U3 + γ2c). This gives: 
 
(2b)  (1-γ2)c = δ((1-γ2)U3 + γ2c). 
 
There are three possible equilibria. Case 1a occurs where both equalities (2a) and (2b) hold. Both 
firms are indifferent between playing T1 and waiting, both will play T1 with a certain chance, and 
T1 will be selected as standard with a positive chance. The equilibrium is (α1, α3). Case 1a is a 
fluke case: conditions (2a) and (2b) both hold only in the special case where a = δ(1-γ2)(U1-U3). 
With a > 0, 0 < δ < 1, and 0 < (1-γ2) < 1, this gives a < U1-U3. The sponsor firm 1 would multiply 
its appropriability bonus a.  
Two other cases occur when only one equality of (2a) and (2b) holds. In case 1b, only 
equality (2b) holds: a+(1-γ2)c > δ((1-γ2)U1 + γ2c) and (1-γ2)c = δ((1-γ2)U3 + γ2c); hence firm 1 
always proposes T1 (its weakly dominant strategy) and firm 3 mixes between T1 and waiting. 
The equilibrium is (1, α3). In case 1c, equation (2a) holds and (1-γ2)c > δ((1-γ2)U3 + γ2c). In this 
case, firm 1 is indifferent, and firm 3 always proposes T1. The associated equilibrium is (α1, 1). 
 The situation in committee 2 is similar, except that firm 2 is the sponsor, firm 4 the ally, 
and T2 the technology they may standardize on. See table 2 for the payoff table.  
 
Table 2: committee 2 session and payoffs 
Firm 4  
T2 Wait 
T2 (a+(1-γ1)c), (1-γ1)c) (y2, y4) Firm 2 
Wait (y2, y4) (y2, y4) 
 
The payoffs yi are δ((1-γ1)Ui + γ1c) (i = 2, 4). As before, there are three possible equilibriums that 
depend on the following conditions: 
 
(3a)  a+(1-γ1)c = δ((1-γ1)U2 + γ1c). 
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(3b)  (1-γ1)c = δ((1-γ1)U4 + γ1c). 
 
This gives as before three cases. Case 2a is where both equalities hold. Both firms are indifferent 
between T1 and waiting. This case implies that a = δ(1-γ1)(U2 -U4). As with case 1a, it can be 
shown that the assumption of case 2a is inconsistent with the other assumptions made. Case 2b is 
where a+(1-γ1)c > δ((1-γ1)U2 + γ1c and (5b) does hold. Firm 2 always proposes T2 and firm 4 is 
indifferent. Firm 4 mixes between playing T2 and waiting. Case 2c is where (5a) holds and (1-
γ1)c > δ((1-γ1)U4 + γ1c). Firm 2 is indifferent and firm 4 always proposes T2. 
Solving the competing committee game 
In equilibrium, in each committee both firms choose their strategies (αi) anticipating on how the 
resulting chance that they standardize, γj, affects the other committee. The chance that either one 
or both committees set a standard in the period is 1-(1-γ1)(1-γ2), where γ1 = α1α3 and γ2 = α2α4. 
There are two pure outcomes. Committee 1 selects T1 immediately, i.e., γ1 = 1. For committee 2 
this means that the payoff of waiting is (c,c) and the payoff for selecting T2 is (a,0). Firm 4 has 
no incentive to adopt T2. Hence, committee 2 will wait, and γ2 = 0. Anticipating this, committee 1 
knows that selecting T1 is a dominant strategy: the payoffs are (a+c, c) for (T1, T1) and (y1, y3) 
for the other actions (see table 1), where (y1, y3) are the discounted payoffs of the next round, 
which are never higher than (a+c, c). This outcome also holds in reverse, where committee 1 
waits, and committee 2 proposes its preferred technology as standard. 
To get around the existence of multiple pure equilibriums, we focus on symmetric mixed 
equilibriums. Combinations of cases 1a and 2a are not possible: there is no solution for the yi´s 
where conditions (2a) and (2b) both hold, and likewise for (3a) and (3b). Combinations of the 
cases 1c and 2c do exist that satisfy the equalities (2a) and (3a). However, it can be shown that 
these do not satisfy the ‘greater than’ conditions on (2b) and (3b).  
Consistent solutions do appear for cases 1b and 2b. In these cases, the sponsor in a 
committee (respectively, firm 1 or 2) always proposes its own technology as standard, and the 
other committee member (respectively, firm 3 or 4) mixes between either accepting the standard 
or waiting for another round. The allies are a mixed blessing to the sponsors: they help to turn a 
technology into a standard (a bandwagon effect), but they do slow down adoption of the 
technology. Straightforward but lengthy computations give the following solutions: 
 
(4a)  δ
δδδ
2
))32(11(* −+−+= cU i , for i = 3, 4. 
(4b)  δ++= 1
aUU ji , for i = 1, 2, and j = 3, 4. 
 
Equation (4b) shows that the sponsors earn more than the followers, but by less than their 
appropriability bonus a. The reason is that there is a chance that the sponsor loses out to its rival. 
Moreover, part of the potential payoffs (a and c) are wasted because of the game play: the delays 
in decision making to prevent incompatibility from happening waste revenues. The total profits 
are: 
 
(5)  
)1(
)))32(11)(1((24
δδ
δδδδδ
+
−+−+++=∑ caU
i
i . 
 
The chance that a committee selects its technology as standard is as follows: 
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(6)  δ
δδδγ
2
)32(11 −+++−=i , for i = 1, 2. 
 
When the game ends, it is because either one or two standards are set in a period. The chance z0 
that no standard is agreed on in a period is (1-γ1)(1-γ2). The chance z1 that one standard is agreed 
on is γ1(1-γ2) + (1-γ1)γ2. The chance that two standards are agreed on simultaneously, z2, is γ1γ2. 
The chance that the game ends in a period is the chance that either one or two standards are set, 
z1+z2, which is 1-(1-γ1)(1-γ2), or: 
 
(7a)  2
2
4
))32(11(
1 δ
δδδ −+−+− . 
 
We interpret this expression as the indicator for the speed of standardization. The chance that if 
the game ends, it ends with only one standard is z1/(z1+z2). This can be shown to be equal to the 
following expression: 
 
(7b)  δ
δ
31
11 +
−− . 
 
We interpret this expression as the indicator for the expected degree of compatibility, associated 
with competing committees. Together, the expressions (7a) and (7b) locate the position of the 
competing coalitions in figure 1. See figure 3, which tracks (7a) and (7b) for values of the 
discount rate from 0 to 1. 
 
Figure 3: expected degree of compatibility of competing coalitions as function of expected speed 
 
Figure 3 shows that increasing the speed of standardization reduces the chance that compatibility 
is achieved. The faster the standardization process is, the larger the chance that two committees 
select standards simultaneously, thus creating incompatibility. It also shows that a standardization 
mode with competing committees is capable of realizing compatibility with a high degree of 
probability, if at the cost of very slow standardization. A given coalition structure (here, two 
symmetric coalitions) can give rise to a large variety of outcomes, depending on the incentives 
and information of the decision makers. We now turn to the case where firms form a grand 
coalition to select an industry-wide standard. 
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Speed
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
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Grand coalition 
In the grand coalition consensus among the four firms selects a standard. As before, firms 1 and 2 
sponsor a technology as standard. Firms 3 and 4 benefit from a standard, but are indifferent about 
which technology becomes the standard. In a consensual decision making style, a technology is 
selected as standard if all four firm concur. If all firms were indifferent between T1 and T2, the 
chance that all four select the same technology as standard would be (1/2)3, i.e., 0.125. This 
would lead to very slow standardization. Moreover, firms 3 and 4 might identify different 
technologies as preferred standard, thus slowing down standardization, even though they are 
indifferent between both technologies. One way to speed up decision making would be to create a 
subcommittee of firms 1 and 2. They shall select a standard. Firms 3 and 4 will endorse whatever 
choice they make. 8 
 This suggests that the game play in the grand coalition is between both sponsors. Their 
payoff matrix is as follows: 
 
Table 3: grand coalition session and payoffs 
Firm 2  
T1 T2 
T1 (a+c, c) (y1, y2) Firm 1 
T2 (y1, y2) (c, a+c) 
 
The expected payoffs of this game are U1 for firm 1 and U2 for firm 2. The payoffs y1 and y2 are 
the expected, discounted payoffs of playing the committee game in the next period: yi = δUi, 
where the discount rate δ is in between 0 and 1 (no discounting).  
If we assume that yi < c < a+c, there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (T1, T1) and (T2, 
T2). We use the mixed equilibrium as solution concept. In a mixed equilibrium, each firm plays 
every possible action with a certain chance. Firm i (= 1, 2) plays T1 with a chance of αi and T2 
with a chance of 1- αi. This gives expected benefits as follows: 
 
(8a)  U1 = α1α2(a+c) + ((1-α1)α2 + α1(1- α2))y1 + (1-α1)(1-α2)c. 
 
(8b)  U2 = α1α2c + ((1-α1)α2 + α1(1- α2))y2 + (1-α1)(1-α2)(a+c). 
 
In a mixed equilibrium, each firm chooses αi to keep his rival player indifferent between its two 
actions. Firm 1 chooses α1 such that for firm 2 the expected payoff of playing T1, α1*c+(1-α1)*y2, 
equals its expected payoff of playing T2, α1*y2+(1-α1)*(a+c). This gives the following equation 
that solves for α1: 
 
(9a)  α1*c+(1-α1)*y2 = α1*y2+(1-α1)*(a+c). 
 
Firm 2 chooses α2 such that firm 1 is indifferent between selecting T1 and T2: 
 
(9b)  α2*(a+c)+(1-α2)*y1 = α2*y1+(1-α2)*c. 
 
These computations give the solutions for both chances α1 and α2, as functions of the payoffs in 
table 3. 
                                                     
8 See footnote 4 why we rule out the case where firms 3 and 4 set up a subcommittee, select a standard, and 
impose it on the sponsors, firms 1 and 2. 
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 The other two firms, 3 and 4, adopt whatever standard firms 1 and 2 propose. Their 
expected payoffs are as follows: 
 
(9c)  Ui = (α1α2+(1-α1)(1-α2))c + ((1-α1)α2 + α1(1- α2))yi , where yi = δUi (i = 3, 4). 
 
The chance that the grand coalition selects a standard within a time period is (α1α2 + (1-α1)(1-α2)).  
 The results of this model are unfortunately very cumbersome. The sum total of expected 
payoffs are as follows: 
 
(10)  Σ14Ui = 
Ha+ 4cL I−a− 2c+èHa+2cL2 +4cHa+ cL H−2+δL δ MHa+ 2cL H−2+ δL δ  
 
The indicator for the speed of standardization by the grand coalition is the chance that it sets a 
standard within a period: 
 
(11) H−1+δL Ia2 − 4ac− 4c2 +4acδ + 4c2δ − Ha+ 2cL èHa+2cL2 +4cHa+ cL H−2+δL δ MI−Ha+2cL H−1+ δL+èHa+ 2cL2+ 4cHa+ cL H−2+ δL δ M2  
 
The derivative of expression (11) to the appropriability bonus a is the following expression: 
 
(12) 
2acH−2+ δL2H−1+ δLèHa+ 2cL2+ 4cHa+ cL H−2+ δL δ Ia−2cH−1+ δL −aδ +èHa+ 2cL2+ 4cHa+cL H−2+ δL δ M2  
 
Since δ < 1, it follows that this expression is negative. A higher appropriability bonus slows down 
the grand coalition: it makes the competing sponsors more eager on proposing their preferred 
technology as standard. The derivative to c can be shown to be positive: if the compatibility 
bonus increases relative to the appropriability bonus, this speeds up the grand coalition. 
 
Comparing the grand coalition to the competing committees 
We will compare the results of the grand coalition and the case with competing committees. 
There are three indicators to look at: the total profits (Σ14Ui), the profits of a sponsor (U1), and the 
chance that a standard (or two standards) is selected within the period. The latter indicator 
determines the speed of standardization: the higher the selection chance is, the higher the 
expected speed of standardization.  
Equation (12) shows that a higher appropriability bonus slows down the grand coalition, 
and a higher compatibility bonus speeds up the grand coalition. Equation (7a) shows that the 
appropriability bonus and the compatibility bonus do not have this effect on the competing 
committees. Hence, we derive the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: an increasing appropriability bonus tends to slow down a grand coalition, while an 
increasing compatibility bonus tends to speed it up, compared with a case of competing 
committees.  
 
Due to the rather cumbersome equations, we use numerical simulation for further results. We will 
call e the ratio of the appropriability bonus to the compatibility bonus: e = a/c, where e > 0. The 
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relative speed of standardization by a grand coalition compared to competing committees can be 
deduced from the difference in the chance that a standard is set within a time period. The 
following expression gives this differential: 
 
(13) 
 
−
2H2+eL$ a2Ie2+4H−1+δL2+4eH−1+δL2Me2 H−1+δL
ae + H1+ δL è1+ H2− 3δL δ + H−1+δLI8H−1+δL+8eH−1+δL+e2H−1+3δLMe2
2δ2  
 
Inspection shows that the appropriability bonus a can be factored out. Hence, the relative speed of 
the grand coalition versus competing committees depends only on e and on δ. For a discount 
factor equal to one, this value equals zero. With such a high discount rate, the standardization 
process in both standardization modes grinds to a halt. Both sponsors are eager to impose their 
own technology as standard, and this intransigence delays standardization. If the discount rate is 
unity, the delay does not reduce their discounted revenues.  
Simulation gives the following results, see table 4. From left to right the columns have 
increasing values of δ from 0.1 to 0.9 in steps of 0.2. Each column list values from e = 0.000001 
at the top to e = 2 at the bottom, in steps of 0.2. 
 
Table 4: Speed differential between the grand coalition and competing committees 
 
The speed differential is nearly everywhere negative. The grand coalition tends to standardize 
slower than competing committees. Along a row (for a given level of e), higher values of δ reduce 
the speed disadvantage of the grand coalition. The reason is that the more important future 
revenues are (the higher δ), the less important it is for competing committees to set a standard 
quickly, at the risk of selecting competing technologies and wasting future revenues. Along a 
column, the higher e is, the larger the speed disadvantage of the grand coalition. The higher the 
appropriability bonus a is relative to the compatibility bonus c, the more the sponsors insist on 
their technology becoming standard, the slower the grand coalition is. The appropriability bonus 
leads to politicking in the grand coalition. It should now be intuitive why in the table the grand 
coalition tends to be quicker than competing committees only in the right upper corner of table 4, 
where e is very low (0.000001) and δ is very high (0.9). 
 The choice between a grand coalition and competing committees recognizes a trade-off. 
The competing committees tend to be quicker. The grand coalition, however, ensures 
compatibility of the four firms, whereas the competing committees may lead to incompatible 
technologies being selected. Expression (7b) shows that for δ < 1, the chance that the competing 
committees set a single standard is less than unity. Apart from the case of very high δ’s, there is 
thus a trade-off between speed and compatibility.  
−0.390625 −0.43674 −0.352539 −0.223713 0.0149951
−0.496196 −0.446251 −0.363286 −0.242527 −0.0756781
−0.507021 −0.460372 −0.384114 −0.281289 −0.179908
−0.52108 −0.478394 −0.409658 −0.323517 −0.247362
−0.536643 −0.497939 −0.436165 −0.362557 −0.291605
−0.552702 −0.51768 −0.461797 −0.396676 −0.322338
−0.568672 −0.536902 −0.485754 −0.425956 −0.34479
−0.584219 −0.555238 −0.507767 −0.451007 −0.361862
−0.599162 −0.572526 −0.52783 −0.472512 −0.375263
−0.613411 −0.588716 −0.546055 −0.491084 −0.386051
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Figure 4 illustrates the trade-off between speed and compatibility. It shows the expected 
speed and compatibility for the competing committees and for the grand coalition for a = 1, e = 1, 
and δ = 0.5. The chance that the grand coalition establishes only one standard (compatibility) is 
unity. The left most point is for the grand coalition; the point on the right is for the competing 
committees. The larger δ is, the closer these points lie together, and the more they shift to the top 
left side of the graph (high compatibility, slow speed). 
 
Figure 4: the expected speed and compatibility 
 
Given the trade-off between speed and compatibility, the question is which type of 
coalition structure will the firms prefer? If we look at firm 1, one of the two sponsors in the game, 
will it prefer a grand coalition or competing committees? The difference between the payoff of 
firm 1 in the case of the grand coalition and its profit in the case of competing committees is the 
following expression (where again e = a/c): 
 
(14) 
 
e$ a2Ie2+4H−1+δL2+4eH−1+δL2Me2 H1+ δL + aH−2+ δL H1+ δL è1+ H2− 3δL δ −aH−1+ δL H−e+ δ + 2eδ +δ2L
2eH−2+δL δ H1+ δL  
 
Visual inspection shows that this expression is a multiple of a. The sign depends on two variables 
only: e and δ. We know that 0 < e and 0 < δ < 1. We simulate this for values of e and δ. See table 
5. 
 
 
Table 5: U1 of grand coalition minus U1 of competing committees 
 
3.68727 2.94451 2.4899 2.19469 1.72987
0.76668 0.624049 0.551263 0.504586 0.319265
0.167927 0.141511 0.1389 0.131386 0.00128769
−0.0967497 −0.0751943 −0.0502989 −0.0435628 −0.142398
−0.248722 −0.201457 −0.162338 −0.147831 −0.224504
−0.348652 −0.285521 −0.237751 −0.217839 −0.277664
−0.420042 −0.346186 −0.292537 −0.268348 −0.314898
−0.473963 −0.392376 −0.334399 −0.306605 −0.342433
−0.516346 −0.42891 −0.367556 −0.336627 −0.363621
−0.550668 −0.458638 −0.394533 −0.360832 −0.380431
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Each column in table 5 is associated with one value of δ. From left to right the columns have 
increasing values of δ from 0.1 to 0.9 in steps of 0.2. Each column list values from e = 0.1 at the 
top to e = 2 at the bottom in steps of 0.2. Positive values in the table indicate cases where firm 1 
will prefer the grand coalition; negative values cases where it prefers competing committees. For 
a given δ, an increasing value of e (along a column) changes sign from positive to negative: when 
the appropriability bonus a becomes more important than the compatibility bonus c, firm 1 
switches from preferring a grand coalition to preferring competing committees. There seems no 
large effect of the discount rate on the preference for a grand coalition: the sign of the profit 
difference does not change in the discount rate δ for each value of e (along the rows).  
 We can also compute the difference between total profits with the grand coalition and 
with competing committees. Again, this is a complicated function: 
 
(15) 
 H4+eL$ a2Ie2+4H−1+δL2+4eH−1+δL2Me2H2+eL H−2+δL + aJ2
" 1+H2−3δLδ+ H−1+δLH2δH1+δL+eH−1+2δLL2+δ−δ2 N
e
δ  
 
The parameter a can be bracketed out, which shows that the sign of the difference depends only 
on e (= a/c) and on the discount rate δ. For δ = 1, this expression can be simplified into 
e
ea
+
+−
2
)4(
. Hence, for a discount rate of unity, the total expected profits with a grand coalition 
are less than those with competing committees. For a simulation (where a = 1, without impact on 
the sign of the profit differential), see table 6. 
 
 Table 6: Difference between Σ14Ui of the grand coalition and the competing committees 
 
The results are similar as in the case of profits of firm 1 alone. The larger e is (within a column), 
the more likely that the collective of firms will prefer competing committees to the grand 
coalition. Hence, if the appropriability bonus a increases relative to the compatibility bonus c, this 
tends to shift preferences away from the grand coalition to competing committees.    
 
Conclusions 
This paper shows that having an industry-wide standardization coalition tends to slow down 
standardization, compared to cases where smaller coalitions of firms compete with each other. 
This is consistent with a widely held view. The need to reach an agreement between competitors 
within a grand coalition leads to lengthy negotiations. If sponsors of rival technologies set up 
16.0422 12.7299 10.6285 9.18978 7.07379
4.36803 3.45852 2.88852 2.45282 1.48508
1.98574 1.54455 1.26114 0.993802 0.272641
0.942063 0.696648 0.529602 0.330572 −0.247603
0.350187 0.211552 0.107524 −0.0505907 −0.52763
−0.0333022 −0.104688 −0.168493 −0.29675 −0.697472
−0.302857 −0.327816 −0.363079 −0.46741 −0.808457
−0.503023 −0.493818 −0.507331 −0.591606 −0.884784
−0.657657 −0.622107 −0.618216 −0.685273 −0.939261
−0.780736 −0.72414 −0.705835 −0.757892 −0.979249
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their own coalitions, this should speed up standardization. Competition between standardization 
coalitions does, however, squander some benefits of having a standard. In choosing a 
standardization mode, firms balance two types of coordination failure: the failure to select an 
industry-wide standard (when competing committees support competing technologies) and the 
failure to decide timely (when negotiations in a grand coalition lead to stalemate).  
 Consistent with an argument by Genschel (1997), competing coalitions do not have to 
lead to incompatible technologies. If one committee adopts a standard before the other one, the 
latter will concede defeat and adopt this standard too. Incompatibility only happens in our model 
when the two committees select a standard simultaneously. This can occur with a certain chance. 
By reducing the chance that firms in a coalition select a technology as standard in a given time 
period, the smaller the chance that both committees select a standard at the same time. This does 
slow down the standardization process, however. Competing committees can thus reduce one 
coordination failure (the failure to select a single standard) by somewhat increasing another 
coordination failure (of delaying decision making in a committee).  
The paper also shows that the speed disadvantage of a grand coalition should not be 
exaggerated. Firstly, our results are expectations: a string of luck may lead to quick decision 
making in a grand coalition, whereas as competing coalitions may get stuck in multiple rounds of 
fruitless negotiations. The expected speed disadvantage may also be limited. In fact, we find 
cases where a grand coalition can be quicker than competing coalitions. The reason is that 
competing coalitions may select incompatible technologies as standards. To avoid this, firms 
delay standard selection within the committees. The slower the committees decide about a 
standard, the smaller the chance that they simultaneously adopt incompetence technologies. The 
fear for incompatibility thus delays competing coalitions, and may render the grand coalition the 
quickest solution. 
 The more sponsors of rival technologies stand to gain from having their technology 
selected as standard (the appropriability bonus a), the more they tend to prefer competing 
committees. The more they value future revenues (indicated by the discount rate δ), the more they 
prefer a grand coalition. Short time horizons and high rates of uncertainty thus tend to stimulate 
fragmentation of the standardization process. If committees, including the grand coalition, can 
meet frequently, this shortening of the decision time period translates in our model as a high 
discount rate. This in turn will increase the preference for a grand coalition. If both small 
committees and the grand coalition were to speed up the frequency of their meetings in equal 
measure, this would shift the preference towards the grand coalition. 
 An insight that modelling standardization may give is that the effects of coalition 
structures on compatibility and speed of decision making depend on the behaviour of firms within 
these structures. A given structure, such as competing committees, can lead to widely varying 
outcomes, depending on incentives (see figure 3 for an illustration). These incentives depend on 
goals, information, and also on how decision making in the coalition(s) is structured. Both 
competing committees and the grand coalition benefit from structuring decision making such as 
to speed up decision-making. In the case of competing committees this calls for a proper selection 
of coalition members. By keeping rivals out of a committee, a sponsor of a technology can 
convince its coalition to relatively quickly select its technology as standard. The downside of this 
strategy is that the rival creates its own coalition, and their standard may undercut one’s 
standardization efforts. In the grand coalition, the problem is how to align a large number of firms 
behind one standard. Even in the absence of conflicts of interest, this may take time. All the more 
so when rivals populate the grand coalition. In designing a standardization mode, one should not 
try to avoid coordination failures between coalitions, without understanding the intra-coalition 
coordination failures. Addressing intra-coalition coordination failures appears the prior step, 
before attempting to create industry-wide structures of decision-making. 
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